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BRIEF OF APPELLEES
EXPLANATORY NOTES
All italics and emphasis are added unless otherwise stated.
In 1942 and 1943, when the negotiations for the building
of the new yard and the closing of Ninth South and Fifth
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East Streets were conducted, Maurice Harding was Mayor
and J. P. lVIcGuire and Joseph H. Swapp were the other two
members of the Provo City Commission. In the fall of 1943
there was a municipal election to fill the office of Mayor and
the office of Commissioner held by J. P. McGuire. Mayor
Harding was re-elected. J. P. McGuire failed of re-election
and Blake D. Palfreyman was elected in his place. The Commission :::s so constituted continued in office throughout the
periods and events involved herein. R. K. Bradford, R. S.
Lawrence and E. C. Jensen mentioned herein are respectively:
Executive Assistant to the Trustees of the Railroad, Agent
for the Railroad in Provo, and Attorney for the Railroad.

JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURT
Appellants make no contention that the United States
courts are without jurisdiction in these cases. If the Court
desires to be advised of the nature of its jurisdiction, it is
set forth in Appendix A.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Rule 52 of Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of the United States provides as follows:
Findings of Fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the
credibility of the witnesses.
The court in compliance with that Rule made separate
findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 18-26.) Appellants' Statement of Facts ignores the Court's Findings. They
are not described. They are referred to only once. (P. 4.)
The following vital statements as to facts in appellants'
brief are contrary to the Court's finding and to the uncontradicted or overwhelming weight of the evidence:
a. On pages 2, 8, 21 and 24, that there was no agreement
between the City and Railroad, that their minds never met,
that the matter never passed the negotiation stage. This is
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disproved in Sections 2, 3 and 7 of appellees' Statement of
Case.
b. On page 24, that the Railroad did not act in reliance
on the representations and promises of the Mayor and Commissioners. This is disproved in Section 4 of appellees' Statement of Case.
c. On page 25, that the City Government and the public
did not acquiec;;ce in the closing of the street. This is disproved in Section 5 of appellees' Statement of Case.
d. On page 25, that no irreparable damage would result
to the Railroad from reopening the street. This is disproved
in Section 6 of appellees' Statement of Case.
e. On pages 24 and 25, that the Railroad has not fulfilled conditions imposed by the City. This is disproved in
Section 8 of appellees' Statement of Case.
Appellants' Statement of Case fails to assist the Court
by describing the evidence and referring to record where the
testimony of the various witnesses may be found. For these
reasons appellees are constrained to make their own statement of the case.
Reference to the record herein thus: (R. 20=56-65)
means that the Court's Finding of Fact appears at R. 20 and
evidence supporting it at R. 56-65.
1. The Mayor and Commissioners induced the Railroad
to build the new yards inside instead of outside Provo City
limits in order to secure additional taxes and economic benefits, knowing that the street crossings must be eliminated.
In 1942 and 1943 freight traffic handled in the freight
yards in Provo increased to such an extent that extensive
additional railroad yards had to be constructed. (R. 20=5665.) Bradford explained to the Mayor and Commissioners
in July, 1942 and February, 1943 (R. 20 = 66, 70, 140, 167)
that the Railroad had a free choice of doing this in either of
two ways: first, if Ninth South and Fifth East were closed,
it could enlarge the existing yards within the corporate
limits of Provo City; second, if they were not closed, it would
build new yards south and outside of Provo City. (R. 20 =
69, 140, 167.) Bradford took the entire commission out to the
locations and showed them on the ground (R. 67, 68) how the
workers could get to their work after the crossing closing.
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(R. 68.) The Mayor and Commissioners, in order to increase tax receipts and business and employment within Provo
City, urged the Railroad to enlarge the yards within the limits
of Provo City. (R. 20 = 70, 72, 140, 167, 260.) Bradford
explained to the Mayor and Commissioners that it would be
impossible to comply with their wish unless the crossings
over the railroad tracks by Ninth South and Fifth East Streets
be closed to all travel. (R. 20 = 66, 69, 75, 140, 166, 167,
234, 407.) The Court's finding to this effect is based on the
uncontradicted evidence.
The anticipated benefits have been realized by the City.
(R. 25 = 128, 260.) Assessments of railroad property were
increased on account of the enlarged yards so that taxes were
increased about $2,400 per year. (R. 25 = 127, 260.) Also
the City has had the economic advantages of having the yards
built inside the City. (R. 25 = 260.)
2. Full rrgreement was reached at the Feb. 25, 1943,
.meeting that the street c1·ossings would be eliminated and
the yanls would be built inside the City. Actual commencement of the wo1·k was postponed, becrruse of a protest by
citizens, until April 7, 1.943.
Appellants repeatedly state throughout their brief that
no agreement was ever reached, that the minds of the parties
never met and that the matter never passed the negotiation
stage. The court found the contrary and the evidence abundantly supports the finding.
At a meeting of the Provo City Commission held in its
chambers on February 25, 1943, the Mayor, all Commissioners,
the City Attorney, City Recorder, Bradford, Lawrence and
Jensen were present. (R. 71-73, 138, 319.) Bradford told
them the project would cost over $100,000.00 (R. 140) and
showed them Exhibit 4, (not in the printed record but copies
supplied) a map of the proposed enlargement of yards, showing Ninth South as closed, Fifth East as closed and a cut-off
between Fifth East and Ninth South. (R. 74.) According to
the uncontradicted evidence Bradford told the Commission
that, if the enlarged yards were to be in Provo, Ninth South
would have to be closed. (R. 20 = 75, 140, 16,6, 167, 234, 407.)
Thus fully informed, the Mayor and Commissioners promised
that an ordinance closing the crossings would be passed. (R.
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20 = 77, 78, 141, 168.) The court so found (R. 20). That finding is supported by the evidence of Bradford (R. 77, 78), Jensen (R. 141) and Lawrence (R. 168). The Mayor denied that
the Commission promised the Railroad to pass an ordinance (R.
237) but merely said that the Commission would consider passing it. (R. 236.) Commissioner Swapp both affirmed and
denied that any commitment was made at the meeting. (R.
377.) Commissioner McGuire, when asked the direct question
whether any commitment was made, answered, "I don't recall
that there was any definite statement to that effect." (R. 409.)
The Mayor and Commissioners wanted to avoid the
appearance of steam rollering the closing of the streets, (R.
187) and it was agreed that the newspaper story, Exhibit 21
(R. 531), would be given to the press. (R. 78, 187, 190, 191.)
It was published on Feb. 25, 1943, in the Provo Herald, a
newspaper of general circulation in Provo. It described the
project, stated that it would necessitate the closing of Ninth
South and described the cut-off road between Ninth South
and Fifth East. It stated that the Commission was studying
the matter, rather than that the matter was agreed upon, to
avoid the appearance of arbitrariness. (R. 187, 190, 191, 202,
203.)
On Feb. 25, 1943, it was agreed that the Railroad attorney
was to prepare the necessary ordinance for the closing of the
street and send it to the City Attorney. (R. 75, 77, 78, 142,
236, 377, 409.) Under date of March 9, 1943, the Railroad
attorneys addressed a letter to the City Attorney (Exhibit
28, R. 143, 144, 145) enclosing a form of ordinance (Exhibit
29, R. 145, 146) with the statement that it was to be passed
to cover the closing of the streets. The City Attorney admitted receiving that letter and form of ordinance (R. 144),
and never expressed any surprise at or dissent from the statements made in Exhibit 28. (R. 154.)
In a protest dated February 27, 1943, a group of approximately two hundred citizens, led by Frank C. Cordner, protested the closing of Ninth South. (Exhibit 64, R. 91.) The
Provo Herald of March 2, 1943, described it. (Exhibit 22, R.
532.) The Railroad knew of it and kept in close touch with
the Mayor (R. 83), repeatedly asking when the ordinance
would be passed, (R. 83, 168). Time was precious and the
Commission was urged to authorize the closing of the streets
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so that the construction could be commenced at the earliest
possible moment. (R. 21 = 168.)
3. The Commission on April 7, 1.943, authorized the Railroad to go ahead with construction and promised that the
ordinance ?.could be passed.
On April 7, 1943, the Mayor told the Railroad Agent at
Provo that the ordinance would be passed, the streets closed,
and that the Railroad could go ahead immediately with the
construction without waiting on legal formalities. The Court
so found. (R. 21.) The evidence supporting this finding is
overwhelming. R. S. Lawrence testified that Mayor Harding
so stated. (R 169.) Mayor Harding himself on cross examination admitted that his understanding was that the Railroad was given verbal permission to close the street. (R.
254-258.) A practising attorney at the Utah bar for twentyone years ( R. 253) , Harding never claimed that the closing of
Ninth South was unauthorized. (R. 251-253.) On the contrary
he wanted the Railroad to go ahead and close the street because
he expected the Public Service Commission would force the
Railro;:1,d to build a viaduct. (R. 258.) It was sort of an entrapment. On January 10, 1945, he voted "No" to a resolution to
require the reopening of Ninth South. (R. 254.) Commissioner
Palfreym'm in that meeting read a prepared statement in
which he asserted, "Mayor Harding states that the City Commission gave the Railroad Company verbal permission to close
the road" * * * . (R. 255.) Harding didn't deny that he
made that statement. (R. 255.) He admitted that it was his
understanding that oral permission had been given to the
Railroad to close Ninth South (R. 255) and that Mr. Lawrence
had been so informed pursuant to authority of the Commission.
(R. 256, 257.)
On April 9th the Provo Herald published an article that
Ninth South was to be closed. (R. 90, 169, Exhibit 26, R. 533.)
The inference is irresistible that the Mayor gave the story
to the press. It was not given to the press by the Railroad.
A reporter asked Lawrence for it and was referred to the
Mayor. (R. 169.) The newspaper article states: "Closing
of Ninth South Street-will be ordered by the City Commission
in an ordinance to be adopted next week." It then directly
quotes Mayor Maurice Harding as stating: ""With numerous
tracks to be constructed across the street, a dangerous hazard
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would result unless the road is closed, Mayor Maurice 1-Iarding
stated." This newspaper clipping was in Mayor Harding's own
scrap book. (R. 90, 268.) Mayor Harding was in court throughout the trial and was a witness, but did not deny that he made
the statements in the newspaper article. Exhibit 26 (R. 533).
Moreover, Lyle E. Waid, a witness produced by Provo City,
quoted Mayor Harding as saying to him in 1943 that Ninth
South Street would never be reopened. (R. 366.) Mayor Hardi~g did not contradict this evidence.
The actions and behavior of the Railroad men and the
Mayor and Commissioners immediately after April 7, 1943 demonstrate that all of them understood that the Railroad was
authorized to go ahead in advance of the passage of the ordinance. The Agent at Provo on April 7th telephoned to Salt Lake
that the work could commence at once. (R. 83, 169.) On April
7, 1943 the Railroad Superintendent wrote to the Division
Engineer (Exhibit 25, R. 85) that work was to proceed. (R.
86.) On April 7, 1943 Bradford addressed a letter to the Railroad attorneys, with copies to seven officials of the three railroads involved, Union Pacific, Utah Railway and D. & R. G. Vv'.,
reciting the agreement with Provo City as to the closing of
the streets and abandonment of the property occupied by the
streets, with full information as to the reversion of the vacated
property and with instructions to the attorneys as to what
should be done to consummate the transaction agreed upon
with Provo City. (Exhibit 24, R. 87-90.)
4. The Railroad relied on the promises and representations of the Mayor and Commissioners by abandoning the
alternative of building outside of Provo, by building the cutoff road and by constructing the new yards at a cost of
$160,000.00.

Appellants repeatedly assert that equitable estoppel is inapplicable because the Railroad did not act in reliance on the
promises and representations of the .Mayor and Commissioners.
In so contending they ignore the Court's findings to the contrary, (R. 21) and the undisputed evidence.
The Railroad, relying on that promise, abandoned the
alternative of building outside of Provo in the open country
where there vwuld be no problem of city streets crossing the
yards.
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The Railroad, relying on the promise (R. 206) immediately after April 7, 1943 secured easement for (R. 96) and
constructed (R. 96) the cut off road, 41.25 feet wide by 625 feet
long (R. 97), from Fifth East to Ninth South. The cutoff road
was constructed by the Railroad, accepted as a public road, was
scraped and graded by Provo (R. 416) and has been constantly
used as such. (R. 261, 416.) It is shown on the Provo map as
a public street. (R. 261.)
The Railroad secured property rights necessary for the
new yards and grading therefor was commenced north of the
crossing on April 11, 1943 (R. 181) and continued until September, 1943. (R. 94, 95.) The Ninth South crossing was
barricaded and closed to traffic in May, 1943. (R. 182.) Eight
new tracks were laid across Ninth South in June and July, 1943
(R. 183) at a cost to the Railroad of $160,000. (R. 21, 22 =
94-101.)
5. The City government and the public knew of and
acquiesced in the closing of the streets.
Appellants' brief, page 25, contends that neither the City
government nor the public acquiesced in the closing of the
street. The Court found (R. 22, 23) and the evidence conclusively shows that they did.
Mayor Harding said that he expected the Railroad to go
ahead as it did, build the yards and barricade Ninth South,
and that is why he didn't protest or prevent when he saw the
Railroad so doing. (R. 258, 259.) J.P. McGuire, Commissioner
of Streets (R. 412), knew when the streets were barricaded in
May, 1943 (R. 413), wasn't surprised (R. 413), and made no
objection or protest (R. 416, 417). When the Railroad provided
the cut-off road he accepted it and scraped and graded it. (R.
416.) Commissioner Swapp knew that the streets were barricaded in May, 1943 (R. 383). The Mayor and Commissioners
discussed the barricading of the streets (R. 383) and nothing
was said to the effect that the Railroad was closing the streets
without authority (R. 384).
No one in the Provo City government made any protest or
objection. (R. 171, 182.) The Mayor, Commissioners, City
Attorney and City Engineer were in close touch with the construction of the new yards. They knew of the closing and barricading of Ninth South in May, 1943 (R. 251). They didn't communicate with the Railroad in any way about the closing and

v. D. & R. G. W. R. R. CO. ET AL.

9

barricading. (R. 251.) The Commission made no charge that
the closing and barricading was unauthorized during 1943
or 1944. (R. 252.)
Ninth South and Fifth East have been barricaded and
closed to travel ever since May, 1943. No effort has ever been
made to open Fifth East Street (R. 168, 261). No effort was
made by Provo City to open Ninth South until March, 1945.
(R. 250, 251.) Prior to that time the City did not even ask
the Railroad to open it. (R. 253.)
All of the new yards were completed and in use on or about
September 1, 1943 (R. 22=94, 95) and since that time down to
the time of trial were in active and daily use (R. 22=101, 102)
in the handling of freight traffic.
Provo City in fact co-operated with the Railroad. It was
building some new water pipe lines along Ninth South and in
order to avoid expense made arrangements with the Railroad so
that they would be finished before the tracks were laid. (R.
182, 281.) Moreover, the City changed its plans because of the
projected railroad yard enlargement and put in an additional
six inch cast iron pipe line so that the City wouldn't later have
to tunnel under the many tracks. ( R. 287.) This was recommended by the City Engineer to the Mayor and Commissioners
in April, 1943 for the stated reason that the pipe line should
be put in ahead of the new tracks. (R. 287.) The Railroad
left the new tracks open until after the City finished its trench.
(R. 183.) At the request of the City the Railroad did some
of the City's work and was reimbursed for it. (R. 183, 184, 282.)
There was full co-operation between the City and the Railroad
throughout the construction. (R. 23 = 281-299.)
The fact of the closing of Ninth South and Fifth East
Streets was conspicuously published in the Provo Press. (R.
22-23 =Exhibit 26, R. 90, 533) and was well known to citizens
and residents of Provo City and Utah County. (R. 23 = 319,
342, 361, 366.) Approximately two hundred residents of Provo
City and Utah County prior to March 4, 1943, and thereafter
protested in writing to the Mayor and Commissioners about the
closing of Ninth South Street, but took no other or effective
measures to prevent the same. (R. 23 = 346.) All other citizens and residents of Provo City and Utah County acquiesced
in and made no objection to the closing of Ninth South Street.
(R. 23.) No objection has ever been made to the closing of
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Fifth East Street where it formerly approached to and joined
with Ninth South Street, by Provo City, its Mayor, any of its
Commissioners, or any of the citizens or residents of Provo
City or Utah County. (R. 23 = 168.)
6. The opening of a street across the yards would result
in irreparable damage to the Railroad.
Appellants' brief, page 25, says opening the street would
not cause irreparable damage. The Court found and the evidence conclusively shows it would. The opening of Ninth South
Street across the railroad yards and tracks would make it necessary for trains and cuts of cars being switched or stored to be
divided at the crossing (R. 23 = 103); would make necessary
much slower handling of trains and cars in the yards (R. 23
=
189); would reduce the usefulness and efficiency of said
yards to the extent of approximately fifty percent (R. 23 =
104) ; would greatly increase the cost of operation of said railroad by said Trustees (R. 23 = 103); would constitute a serious danger and hazard to the public traveling across said railroad yards and tracks (R. 23 = 103-105, 187-190, 191-199);
might make it impossible to handle the traffic (R. 24 = 104) ;
would interfere with the efficient operation of the railroad and
increase the costs of operation (R. 24 = 103-106) ; and might
require abandonment of the new yards and relocation of the
same outside Provo City at a cost of approximately $100,000.00.
(R. 24 = 103-105, 187-190, 191-199.)
Exhibit No. 7 (R. 511), No. 8 (R. 513), and No. 11 (R.
519), are pictures of the area formerly crossed by Ninth South
over the Railroad yards. Exhibits No.9 (R. 515), and No. 10
(R. 517), show the barricade on the east side. Exhibits No.
12 (R. 521), and No. 13 (R. 523), show the barricade on the
west side, partially restored.
Provo City has never made any offer to reimburse
Trustees, or otherwise place them in statu qu.o, for losses and
damages which will result to the property of the debtor if such
crossing were to be reopened. (R 24.)
7. No disagreement between the City and Railroad existed
prior· to September, 1943, until after the yar·ds were built and
just before a City election to elect a ma.yor aud commissioner.
Appellants' brief, page 2, asserts that "a full blown controversy developed, the Railroad and City officials charging
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each other with being unfair." Ninth South was closed in
May, 1943. (R. 182.) The yards were completed and in operation by September, 1943. (R. 94, 95.) There is no evidence of
any disagreement about the matter until the meeting of the
Commission in the latter part of September, 1943, when
Bradford charged that the Commission had failed to keep its
word about the ordinance, (R. 106, 547) and Mayor Harding
charged that the Railroad hadn't fulfilled some of its promises.
(R. 5'17.) Even then the City did not claim that the Railroad
had acted without authority in closing Ninth South but only
that it had not complied with certain requirements. (R. lOG,
107, 241, 242.)
Mayor Harding and Commissioner McGuire were up for
election in November, 1943. George T. Harrison was candidate for Mayor and attacked Mayor Harding and the Commissioner for closing Ninth South. He wrote to the Public
Service Commission on September 20, 1943, (R. 541) and
October 4, 1943, (R. 542). Newspaper articles in the Salt
Lake Tribune of October 3, 1943, (R. 543) and the Provo
Herald of October 3, 1943, (R. 545) described this attack.
From that time on the matter was involved in politics. The
Mayor and City Commissioners did not keep their promise to
pass the ordinance closing Ninth South and Fifth East Streets
and finally in the early part of 1945, contrary to their representations and promises, commenced threatening to open
Ninth South Street across said yards and tracks (R. 23 =
170, 171) ; and on March 9, 1945, removed the barricades on
the east and west sides of the Denver and Rio Grande Western
Railroad yards and tracks and commenced the reconstruction of a roadway along Ninth South Street across said yards
and tracks. (R. 23 = 170, 171, 245.)
8. The Railroad has not failed to comply with any condition imposed by the City to the closing of the streets.
Appellants' brief, pages 24 and 25, assert that the City
imposed five conditions before the street would be closed.
The Court found that only two conditions were imposed (R.
20, 21) and that the Railroad had not failed to fulfill them.
(R. 24, 25.) The evidence overwhelmingly supports the court's
finding.
After the yards were built inside Provo at their request,
Mayor and Commissioners attempted to excuse their failure
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to pass the ordinance by wholly unsupported claims that the
Railroad had not performed its promises. There is a lot of
loose talk in the record by Mayor Harding and Commissioners
Swapp and McGuire to the effect that their agreement to
pass the ordinance was not kept because the Railroad didn't
live up to its obligations in five particulars: first, that the
Railroad would furnish some substitute crossing which could
only be a viaduct; second, that the Railroad would eliminate
the protests by the citizens who used the crossing; third, that
the Railroad was to secure authority from the Public Service
Commission to cross Ninth South; fourth, that the Railroad
was to pay for the cost of rebuilding certain water and light
lines paralleling the cutoff road; and fifth, that the blocking
of traffic by trains at University Avenue would be eliminated.
There is no substance in the evidence as to any of these
excuses. As to the first one the court found and the evidence
is, without any conflict, that the Railroad did not represent
or promise Provo City that it would provide any crossing
over, under or upon said railroad tracks but on the contrary
has affirmatively and consistently informed Provo City, its
Mayor and Commissioners that it would not do so. (R. 24 =
92, 141, 286, 396, 410.)
As to the second excuse, the court found that the Rfl.ilroad
never represented to no;· promised Provo City that it would
eliminate the protests or objections of any citizens or residents
of Provo City and Utah County to the closing of said streets,
but on the contrary affirmatively and consistently stated
that it would not do so. (R. 24.) Mayor Harding testified
both on direct (R. 234) and cross (R. 263) that Bradford
stated at the February 25, 1943, meeting in the most specific
and positive way that the Railroad could and would do nothing
to eliminate the pro! ests. Bradford also so testified (R. 131).
Commissioner M:cGuire said-"it was stated that the matter
(i.e. the protests) perhaps could be taken care of" (R. 407).
But he didn't testify as to who made such a statement or who
would do the taking care of. Commissioner Swapp testified
that the Railroad at the meeting of .July 14, 1942, "agreed to
take care of any protests-" (R. 374). He said he was a
little confused about later meetings (R. 375) but did describe
his recollection of the meeting of February 25, 1943, (R. 376)
and didn't mention any agreement as to taking care of protests.
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In view of the vague and confm;ed nature of Swapp's evidence
and the clear-cut statements by Bradford (R. 131) and Mayor
Harding (R. 234, 263), the fact finder could hardly find
that any such agreenent was made.
As to the third excuse, the court found that the Public
Service Commission of Utah informed the Railroad that it
was not concerned with the closing of Ninth South Street
and Fifth East Street or with the occupation by said railroad
tracks of the space formerly occupied by said streets. (R.
24.) This was according to the uncontradicted evidence of
Bradford (R. 108) and .Jensen (R. 148). They quoted the
Chairman of the Public Service Commission as so saying and
of adding that they were not going to pull the chestnuts of the
Provo City Commission out of the fire.
As to the fourth excuse, the court found that Provo
City has never moved the water and light lines referred to;
has never billed Trustees for the cost thereof; and Trustees
have repeatedly stated their willingness to 1x1y such costs
and have requested bills therefor. (R. 24, 25.) This is supported by the uncontradicted evidence of Bradford (R. 107,
Ex. 30 R. 111, Ex. 40 R. 122) and Mayor Harding (R. 314).
As to the fifth excuse, the court found that at conferences
prior to April 7, 1943, between the Mayor and Commissioners
acting for Provo City and Bradford, Bradford stated that the
proposed reconstruction of the yards and tracks, if within
Provo City, would involve removal of the railroad wye from
its then location near Sixth South Street and University
Avenue to a position south and east thereof; that the Trustees
intended to move the freight office, house and dock from their
location east of University Avenue to a new location approximately two blocks west thereof; that the west lead to the new
yards would be approximately 800 feet east of University
A venue; and that all of these measures would tend to reduce
the blocking of University A venue by the Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad operations (R. 25). The court
further found that all of the measures so described by Bradford have been fulfilled and tend to reduce the blocking of
traffic at University Avenue by the Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad operations; and that University Avenue
is also crossed by tracks of the Union Pacific Railroad
immediately south of the tracks of the Denver and Rio Grande
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Western Railroad (R. 25). The court noted a lack of evidence
as to whether the street blocking was caused by the Denver
and Rio Grande Western or Union Pacific (R. 25). The
court's findings are supported by the evidence of Bradford
(R. 482-490). It would have been silly for the Railroad to
have agreed to eliminate the blocking of University A venue
when part of it would be by Union Pacific and some blocking
at a grade crossing is inevitable. (R. 482-490.) No witness
testified that the Railroad made any such promise. Commissioner Swapp came nearest to such evidence. He said the
Railroad promised "to relieve the burden on University
A venue." (R. 37 4.) He didn't testify that the Railroad
promised to eliminate it. Commissioner McGuire testified
that Bradford expressed the thought that the new yard would
"minimize the congestion on University Avenue." (R. 407.)
Mayor Harding quoted Bradford as stating that the new
yards would move the switching farther south, which would
"free University Avenue from congestion so that the only
traffic on University A venue would be moving trains." Bradford, of course, was talking about Denver and Rio Grande
Western traffic, not Union Pacific, because he wouldn't know
about that.
BRIEF OF ARGUMENT
I

UNDER WELL SETTLED UTAH LAW THE DISTRICT
COURT PROPERLY ADJUDGED PROVO CITY ESTOPPED
FROM CLAIMING THAT THE CROSSING WAS NOT
LEGALLY VACATED.
HEREIN OF APPELLANTS POINTS A, B and G.

The District Court and this Court should follow the law
as announced by the Utah Courts.
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 82 L. Ed.
1188, 58 S. Ct. 817.
This is true in equity cases also.

Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202,
82 L. Ed. 1290, 58 S. Ct. 860.
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It is true also as to the bankruptcy court as to questions
of the sort here involved.

Prudence Realization Corporation v. Geist, 316 U.
S. 89, 86 L. Ed. 1293, 62 S. Ct. 978.
Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder,
318 U.S. 434, 87 L. Ed. 884, 63 S. Ct. 679.
It has been well settled law of Utah since 1917 that
municipal corporations may be estopped with respect to
public streets and property.
Wall

v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 Pac. 766.

Plaintiff contended that Eighth South Street between
Tenth East and Thirteenth East was only 66 feet in width
and that the City should be restrained from digging a sewer
excavation outside of such 66 foot limit. The City contended
that the street had been established 132 feet wide by original
plats prior to 1871. Wall contended the City should be
estopped because in 1891 the City approved a plat of Fremont
Heights in which Eighth South Street was shown as only
66 feet in width. The city attempted to contend that its action
in authorizing the approval of the Fremont Heights Addition
was ulm vires, illegal and void but was estopped so to do.
The court stated the equities in the case as follows: in
1891 the question arose as to the width of the street; the
City Council went upon the premises, inspected them and
authorized the City Engineer to approve the plat; thereafter \Vall's predecessor in interest deeded certain interests
in lots for a nominal consideration; thereafter Wall loaned
money on the security of a mortgage on the property in question which was thereafter foreclosed and the property bought
by Wall; thereafter Wall sold and conveyed parts of the land
in question by warranty deeds; improvements were made on
the land in question and taxes levied and paid thereon.
On page 604 the court quoted with approval the following statement of the law from 3 Dillon, Municipal Corporation
(5th Ed.) Sec. 1194:
It will perhaps be found that cases sometimes
arise of such a character that justice requires that
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an equitable estoppel shall be asserted even against
the public, but if so, such cases will form a law unto
themselves, and do not fall within the legal operation
of limitation enactments. The author cannot assent
to the doctrine that, as respects public rights, municipal corporations are impliedly within ordinary limitation statutes. It is unsafe to recognize such a principle. But there is no danger in recognizing the
principle of an estoppel inpais as applicable to exceptional cases, since this leaves the courts to decide the
question, not by mere lapse of time, but upon all the
circumstances of the case to hold the public estopped
or not, as right and justice may require."
The Utah Court emphasized that the City had benefited
from increased taxes and had made no offer to place Wall in
statu quo, both of which facts occur in the case at bar. Said
the court on p. 606:
In additicn to this the defendant went on for years
and years m~scssing this property against the plaintiff as
private property. Its revenues were increased by hundreds of dollars by the sums exacted from the plaintiff on the assumption of the defendant that the
property assessed belonged to her. As far as the
record disclosed not even the slightest pretense of an
offer has ever been m«de to place her in statu quo.
On page 607 the court said :
We hold that this case falls within the exceptional
class of cases referred to by Judge Dillon, and that it
is the duty of the court to decide it as "right and
justice require." It is our opinion that the city is
estopped from claiming the premises in question as
a public street.
Note that taxes levied against the Railroad by Provo
City have increased $2400.00 per year on account of increased
assessments based on the enlarged yards. (R. 25 = 128.) Note
also that Provo City has made no offer to place the Railroad
in statu quo. (R. 24.)
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Note that the Wall case holds that the estoppel is not merely against the entity of the municipal corporation or its officials but is against the public, which except for the estoppel
would have the use of the public way.
Most of the cases on this subject rely on the statement
of the law made by Judge Dillon and quoted in the Wall
case. Note that the acts of Wall and Wall's predecessors, in
reliance upon the affirmative acts and representations of the
City officials, were not nearly so weighty as in the case at bar.
The Utah law that municipal corporations may be estopped
with respect to public streets was reaffirmed in 1941.

Tooele City v. Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 116 Pac.
(2d) 406.

Appellants' brief on pages 4 and 8 reads as if the Elkington case reversed the principle of the lVall case. On the contrary the principle of the Wall case was reaffirmed and
applied by the court to the facts in the Elkington case and it
was dec:ded that the necessary elements of estoppel were
not· present. Indeed the Supreme Court itself, without suggestion or citation of the \Vall case by counsel, raised the
question as to whether Tooele was estopped under the doctrine
of the Wall case. The question was whether a public street
in a dedicated plat, which had never been used, could be
deeded by Tooele City. It was held that it could not be. The
history of Section 15-8-8 was described and attention was
called to the fact that the statute was not complied with. The
court, however, did not regard that as eliminating the doctrine
of estoppel in pais but expressly recognized and applied the
doctrine of the Wall case. If the court had regarded Section
15-8-8 as eliminating the doctrine of estoppel, that would
have been the short answer in the case. Instead of that the
court considered the equities of the case and concluded that
there was no ground for the application of the estoppel and
the principle of the Wall case. On page 494 the court said:
In the case at bar, the consideration given the
city by Elkington was small, if anything; the deed
was made in contravention of the statute; there is no
evidence that the property has been assessed against
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the defendants or their predecessor in interest; the
time element is short; and there was not a replatting
or a change in the whole neighborhood to the benefit
of all adjacent landowners.
Balancing the justices of the cause, we find there
is no ground for an estoppel in pais as against the
city.
The Utah statute in force at the time of the acts relied
on as constituting an estoppel in the Wall case did not have
the words "by ordinance," which are now and at the time of
the Elkington decision, were in the Utah statute, Section
15-8-8, U. C. A. 1943. (Text is set forth in Appendix B.) The
Elkington case approves the doctrine of estoppel enunciated
in the Wall case at a time when Section 15-8-8 was identical
with the present statute. Thus the Wall case and the Elkington case together settle the Utah law to be that regardless
of Section 15-8-8 a municipality and the public may be estopped
under certain circumstances such as to make it more just that
the public be deprived of a public way than that a private party
be subjected to resulting hardship.
Appellants make no reference to the recent case of Hall
v. North Ogden City, 166 Pac. (2d) 221 (Utah report not yet
printed) decided by the Supreme Court of Utah Feb. 16. 1946,
doubtless because they correctly regard it as not in point. It
neither adds to nor detracts from the principle of the Wall
and Elkington cases.
The Ogden case arose under the United States and Utah
Township Acts. The Utah statute, Compiled Laws of Utah,
1876, Sec. 1174 (set forth in Appendix B), used most emphatic
prohibitory language against any impairment of the public
title. The statute reads in part:
(The title) * * * shall vest in and be held
by the corporation absolutely, and shall not be claimed
adversely by any person or persons whatsoever.
The court sharply distinguishes between a case under the
Township Act and one not under it. The Township Act is not
applicable in the case at bar. Even in the presence of the emphatic prohibitory language of the Township Act, the court
studiously avoided negativing the possibility of equitable estop-
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pel being applicable in a proper case although under that statute. The court placed great emphasis on the circumstance in the
Ogden cac;e that the fee was owned by the city, not the abutter.
In the case at bar the fee is owned by the Hailroad and, upon
the closing of the street, that fee is free and clear of the easement. The court so found and concluded. (R. 25, 26.) Such
was the uncontradicted evidence. (H. 157, 158.) Both the
majority and minority opinions disclose the absence in that
case of the elements essential in or(\er to apply equitable estoppel against a municipal corporation in regard to public streets,
(affirmative misrepresentations, reliance thereon and great
hardship) which elements were present in the Wall case and
so abundantly involved in the case at bar.
The weight of authority from other jurisdictions supports
the rule of the Wall and Elkington cases.
The text books cited by appellants so state and demonstrate
by citations.
On page 22 appellants cite Section 1189 of the Third
Edition of Elliott on Roads and Streets and set forth the
entire section except the last paragraph, which reads as
follows:
It may be, however, that where there has been an
abandonment or there have been misleading acts or
other peculiar circumstances, as in some of the cases
cited in the first two notes to this section, and improvements have been made and rights acquired on the
faith thereof, such a case may be made as will justify
the application of the doctrine of estoppel.
In the Fourth Edition of the same work the author states
the doctrine much more strongly for the application of estoppel
in the case at bar by adding to Sec. 1189 the following sentence:
Such appears to be the general rule sustained by
the weight of authority when the making of valuable
improvements in a highway has been induced by the
act of the municipality.
In footnote 9 on page 1696 Elliott cites cases supporting
his statement from Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Michi-
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gan, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, South
Carolina, Wisconsin, Wyoming, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Texas
and Utah. The Utah case is Wall v. Salt Lake City.
On page 7 appellants cite McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd Edition, Sec. 1515. McQuillin states the rule as
follows:
In many jurisdictions, including some of those
where the rule prevails that title to streets cannot be
acquired by third persons by adverse possession, such
rule is largely nullified by holding that the doctrine of
equitable estoppel may preclude the right of a municipality to remove an obstruction or assert title to the
:::;treet. Citing cases from the Federal Courts, Iowa,
California. Colol·ado, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota,
l\/fississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon,
South Carolina, Wisconsin, Missouri, ·washington,
Georgia, Pennsylvania and Michigan.
Inasmuch as the Wall and Elkington cases establish the
law applicc:blc to the case ~\t bar, the great number of cases
cited by ]iXcQuil1in :md Elliott will not be cited in this brief.
Appellees will disctws only certain cases especially relied on
in the Wall c<.~.se and which refute various contentions of
appellants.
The doctrine announced by Dillon has been approved by
the Sclpreme Court of the United States. Essex v. New England Telegraph Co., 2::l9 U.S. 313, GO L. Ed. 301, 36 S. Ct. 102.
The Telegraph Company made written application for a right
of way for tele~>,Taph poles <tnd lines. The record of the
selectmen disclosed no official action but shortly thereafter the
lines were constructed and maintained for many years. Thereafter the Telegraph Company needed to make repairs and replacements and asked for an official license. This was refused and a threat was made to prevent future operation of
the lines. The court held that the town was estopped. On
page 321 the court said:
A municipal corporation, under exceptional circumstances, may be held to have waived its rights or to
have estopped itself. Randolph County v. Post, 93 U. S.
502, 513; Boone County v. Burlington etc. R. R., 139
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U. S. 684, 693; City Railway V. Citizens' Railroad,
166 U. S. 557, 566; Louisville v. Cumberland Telephone
Co., 224 U. S. 649, 662; Dillon, Municipal Corporations,
5th Ed., Sees. 1194, 1227.

City of St. Joseph v. St. Joseph Terminal R. Co., 268
Mo. 47, 186 S. W. 1080. St. Joseph induced the railroad to
build its terminal inside city limits. To this end it passed
ordinances vacating some streets but not all that were to be
covered by the terminal. The Railway built the terminal over
certain streets which were not so vacated. Later a private
individual bought property abutting on one of these streets
and attempted to open the street. The city was held to be
equitably estopped.
On page 1082 the court said:
If ever the doctrine of equitable estoppel should
be applied in a case brought by a municipal corporation,
the one at bar is a case for ~mch application.

On page 1083 the court said :
The public rights should not be allowed to destroy
vast private rights under the peculiar facts we have
here. There are many cases where public rights,
through the doctrine of equitr,ble estoppel, have been
forced to give way to the more equitable rights of
private parties.
The Wall case relied heaYily upon cases from California
and Wisconsin.
Los Angeles v. Cohn, 101 Cal. 373, 35 Pac. 1002. Los
Angeles brought an action to recover a tract of land at the
intersection of Spring and Main Streets, which was covered
by portion of a building known as "Temple Block," claiming
that the land in question was part of a public street. Before
the building was commenced a controversy arose as to whether
part of it was on the public street. The City Attorney reviewed the matter and reported that Temple was justified
in erecting the building on the ground in question. Thereupon the building was completed and nothing was done until
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the commencement of the present action. On page 1004 the
court said:
If the city had expressly agreed by its officers,
with defendants' grantors, even in parol, that a certain
line should constitute the boundary line between the
street and the grantor's property, and upon the faith
of such agreement the grantors had erected a block
of buildings flush with the line of the street, as agreed
upon by all parties, it would be a hard law that would
allow the city to repudiate that agreement, and destroy
the grantor's property. No court should countenance
such a thing, and an estoppel in pais will rise up in
the pathway of a city, to bar it and its principal, the
people, from the commission of such a grievous wrong;
and, to give the acts of this city a very limited meaning,
we think its conduct in the present case at least equivalent to an oral agreement as to the location of the true
boundry line of the street.
Note the court's reasoning as to an express agreement.
There was such in the case at bar.
It was held that Los Angeles was estopped. Note throughout that the consideration was of the public rights and that
the city did not act formally.
The Wall case also relied on Reuter v. Lawe, 94 Wis. 300,
68 N. W. 955. Lawe owned the fee to the premises in question.
He filed a plat in which the lands in question were designated
as "Public Square." Thereafter a second plat was filed
designating the land in question as "Lawe's Park." Thereafter
Lawe treated the land in question as owned by himself and
paid taxes thereon. He conveyed the same to Reuter. Thereafter the property was treated by the city as public property.
Reuter sued Lawe for breach of warranty, contending that
the property was public property. The court held that the
public was estopped. On page 957 the court said:

* * * But, notwithstanding what has preceded,
it is not an open question in this court that the conduct
of a municipal corporation may be such that a change
of its position will cause such injustice to those who
have relied upon such conduct as to warrant the court
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in preventing such change by an application of the
doctrine of equitable estoppel in pais. * * *
That the equitable rule is applied as freely against
the public as against private persons is not maintained,
but that the courts may administer justice by its aid,
even where that results in controlling the conduct of
municipal corporations, when the facts are such, in the
judgment of the court, as to demand it to prevent manifest injustice and wrong to private persons, is firmly
established.
The TV all case also relied on Paine Lumber Co. v. City
of Oshkosh, 89 Wis. 449, 61 N. W. 1108. Recorded plats established Henry Street between High and Pearl Streets in Oshkosh as public streets. A petition to open Henry Street was
refused by the city council. Thereafter plaintiff built lumber
yards on the lots adjoining Henry Street and across Henry
Street. The City threatened to open the street and plaintiff
brought action to secure an injunction. It was held that the
City was estopped. On page 1111 the court said:
The city authorities have charge of and represent
the rights of the public in and to the public streets,
and it has been held, and we think with great reason,
that under the circumstances such as are presented,
the city and its officers will be held bound by an
estoppel in pais, to prevent injustice, from insisting
upon and exercising as against the present plaintiff
the rights acquired by the recorded plats.
Here also the public was estopped by the acts of the city
officials.
A leading case on this subject (see Kanall v. Wright, 137
Wash. 661, 244 Pac. 245) relied on in the Wall case is
Baldwin v. Trimble, 85 Md. 396, 37 Atl. 176. A road called
"Lanvale Road" ran between two lots owned by plaintiff and
sold by plaintiff to defendant. It was never discontinued as
a highway but its use as such had been discontinued and
buildings had been constructed across it. The court held that
the public was estopped and that therefore plaintiff's title
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was marketable and plaintiff was entitled to specific performance against defendant. On page 178 the court said :

* * * If ever there was a case where the doctrine of equitable estoppel ought to prevail against the
public, it certainly is the case at bar; and we accordingly hold, not that the appellant has acquired by
prescription a right to that part of Lanvale road between his two lots, but that having title thereto under
his deeds, subject to an easement in the public, and the
easement having been abandoned, so that the public
are equitably estopped to reclaim it, his title to the
parcels of the road claimed by him is merchantable.
Note that this plaintiff owned title subject to easement
in the public, the same situation which exists with respect to
Ninth South Street in Provo. (R. 25, 26 ~ 157, 158.)
Peo]Jle v. W?:cuolrlt, 233 III. 572, 84 N. E. 64G.
A plat on page 648 shows the geographical situation.
Wieboldt had units of his depaTtment store on both sides of
an alley. The City permitted him to vacate the alley between
the two buildings if he would construct two alleys at right
angles to the vacated alley so that persons could go back and
forth with only the inconvenience of going around one section
of the building. Wieboldt complied with this. Two years and
nine months later, Friend, who was thereby inconvenienced,
commenced this action and claimed that the City's action
was void because it was wholly for the benefit of a private
individual. The court held that the City was estopped. On page
650 the court said:

* * * If, however, we were in doubt as to the
power of the city eouncil to vacate the portion of said
alley vacated, we think the city council by the passage
of said ordinance and the granting of the permit to
vVieboldt to erect thereon a building connecting the
two buildings formerly owned by him, and by said
action inducing Wieboldt to dedicate to the city a portion of lots 5 and 10 and to otherwise comply with the
terms of said ordinance, has estopped itself to now
evict Wieboldt from the possession of the portion of
said alley vacated by the city council and now in the
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occupancy of Wieboldt by his building * * * and,
if the city is estopped, such estoppel is binding upon
the relators.
Here also the public was estopped by acts of the city
officials.
People v. City of Rock Island, 215 Ill. 488; 74 N. E. 437.
The City granted to the railroad the right to build its railroad
depot across a public street. After the depot had been erected
and used for some years the people attempted to claim ,that
this was unlawful. The court held that the City was estopped
and that the estoppel applied against the public. On page 440
the court said:

It has frep;uently been decided that the doctrine
of estoppel in pais is applicable to municipal corporations, but that they will be estopped, or not, as justice
and right may require. There may be cases where,
under all the circumstances, to assert a public right
would be to encourage and promote a fraud. ·where a
party aeting in good faith under affirmative acts of
a city has made such expensive and permanent improvements that it \vou~d be highly inequitable and unjust
to destroy the rights acquired, the doctrine of equitable
estoppel will be app]ied.

Portland v. Inrnnn Poulsen Lumber Co., 66 Ore. 86; 133
Pac. 829. The lumber company built a lumber mill costing
$800,000.00 on two lots and over and across what the City
claimed was a public road between the two lots. Before the
building, the City stated that the question of whether a road
existed was in doubt and then stood by while the building was
constructed. The court held that the City was estopped. The
court said:
* * * There is not one rule of morals for a
municipality and another for an individual. Should
a private citizen request and induce another to enter
upon his premises under assurance that he would
never be disturbed, and stand by, and without protest
see him spend three quarters of a million dollars in
improvements relying in good faith upon the request
made and the representation put forth, he would be
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spurned from the court room if he attempted to regain
possession of the property.

Boise City v. Wilkinson, 16 Idaho 150, 102 Pac. 148
Boise City was held equitably estopped in a case where a private citizen had used part of a public street for many years. On
this subject the court on petition for rehe:::ring said:
The people in their collective and sovereign capacity ought to observe the same rules and standard of
honesty and fair dealing that is expected of a private
citizen. In their collective and governmental capacity
they should no more be alowed to lull the citizen to
repose and confidence in what would otherwise be a
false and erroneous position than should the private
citizen.
RohTbaugh, MayoT v. Moklr:T, 26 Wyo. 514, 188 Pac. 448.
The municipal authorities of Casper, desiring a plot of ground
for a public library, induced Mokler to exchange the desired
plot for a triangular piece nearby which was part of a platted
public street. Mokler occupied the same and improved it from
that time on. Thereafter the City attempted to oust him.
No formal action had been taken by the City in regard to the
transaction. The court held that the town was equitably
estopped. On page 450 the court said :

It is well settled that, if the meaning of a contract
or instrument is doubtful on its face, the practical construction put upon it by the parties should have great
weight in determining its proper construction. * * *
* * * Having vacated that part of the street,
and having given Mokler possession, and permitted
him to remain in possession and to place improvements
thereon, and having taken possession of the triangle
B, and devoted it to public purposes, so that it cannot
restore Mokler to his former situation, we think the
city is estopped from now repudiating the transaction.

The reasoning in regard to practical construction is noteworthy because in the case at bar the parties placed a practical
construction on the transaction by their acts and conduct.
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The promissoru nature of the r-epresentations by the City
Officials do not detr-act from the application of equitable
estoppel.
Appellants do not r:clise the question, but the Court may
inquire as to whether estoppel may be based upon representations of a promissory nature. It is well settled that it may
be. The authorities are set forth in Appendix C.
Appellant.<> lJC!se theh· a1·gument under- Points A, Band G
upon asertcd facts which iqnore the Court's findings and the
evidence supporting those findings.

On page 21 appellants say:
There is no evidence in all the r·ecord of any positive promise, representation or action on the part of
the Provo City officials authorizing the plaintiffs to
close Ninth South Street. The record reflects nothing
more than negotiations, discussions, correspondence
and controversy between plaintiffs and defendants with
respect to the closing of Ninth South Street. (Emphasis supplied by Appellants.)
This ignores the finding of the Court that the Mayor and
Commissioners promised and represented that the crossing
wou!d be closed; (R. 20) that an ordinance would be passed
closing the street over the tracks; (R. 21) that all legal requirements for the elimination of the crossing would be taken in
due course; and that the Trustees need not wait but might
proceed immediately to construct the new yards and barricade
the street. (R. 21.) The evidence supporting these findings
is fully described in appellees' statement of the case Sections
2, 3 and 7.
On page 23 appellants say:
The Mayor had many telephone conversations with
Mr. Lawrence, but does not think he told him the ordinance would be passed in the conversation on April
9, 1943,This suggests that appellants claim the inference that the
Railroad was not informed that it was authorized to go ahead
and that the ordinance would be passed. If so, it ignores the
finding of the Court described in the foregoing paragraph.

28

PROVO CITY ET AL.

(R. 21.) The evidence supporting that finding is described
in appellees' statement of facts Section 2.
On page 24 appellants say:

* * * The city officials studied the problem,
were favorably impressed, wanted the new yards in
the city if possible, but stated the conditions of closing
Ninth South Street to be: (a) The railroad had to
eliminate the objections on the part of citizens and
workers to the closing thereof; (b) the railroad had
to provide access for workers going to and from work;
(c) the railroad was to pay the cost of water and power
line changeover; (d) the railroad to provide a cutoff
to replace Fifth East Street at the point of intersection
with Ninth South Street. (See exhibits 23, Trans. p.
82; 25, 37, Trans. p. 118); and, {e) the railroad was to
get permission from the Public Utilities Commission
to close the street. (See Exhibit 67, Trans. p. 547.)
These statements ignore the Court's finding that the only
conditions imposed were: First, to furnish the cutoff road
between Ninth South and Fifth East; and second, to pay for
the moving of certain water and light lines. (R. 20, 21.) The
evidence supporting the Court's findings is fully described in
appellees' statement of the case, Section 8.
On page 24 appellants say:
The railroad has failed to eliminate the objections
and to provide access for the workers to and from work.
This statement ignores the Court's finding in paragraph six
of the Findings of Fact (R. 24, 25) to the effect that the
Railroad complied with all of its promises, except to pay for
the moving of water and light lines, as to which bills had
never been submitted although the Railroad had repeatedly
requested submission of bills and expressed willingness to
pay them. The evidence supporting this finding is described
in appellees' statement of the case, Section 8.
On page 24 appellants say:
There was no reasonable reliance by the railroad.
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This ignores the Court's finding that the Railroad in good
faith relied upon the promises and representations and proceeded in reliance thereupon to build the new yards and
barricade the streets and secure the cut-off road. (R. 21.)
The evidence supporting the finding is described in appellees'
statement of the case, Section 4.
On page 24 appellants state that Mr. Bradford knew an
ordinance was necess2,ry. Certainly this is true. That is the
reason he exacted definite promise and representations that
it would be passed.
On page 24 appellants state that Mr. Bradford knew that
permission from the Public Service Commission was necessary.
That is not true and in fact such permission is not necessary,
as is shown herein.
On page 24 appellants state that the plain fact of the
matter is that the Railroad decided to take a chance and make
the improvement without an ordinance. The only chance
taken by the Railroad was that the Mayor and Commissioners
would fail to keep their solemn promise.
On page 24 appellants state that the Railroad actually
commenced work on the new yard before the alleged promises
were supposed to have been made. The evidence of Division
Engineer Zanolis is uncontradicted that the only work done
by the Railroad prior to April 7th was done at a distance from
the Ninth South crossing at a place where the work would be
efficacious whether the yards were built inside Provo or outside Provo. (R. 181.)
On page 25 appellants state that the City officials did
not acquiesce in the closing of Ninth South Street. This
ignores the finding of the court to the contrary. (R. 22, 23.)
The evidence supporting the Court's finding is set forth in
full in appellees' statement of the case, Section 5.
On page 25 appellants state that there was no acquiescence
on the part of the public and that the public did not stand
by and permit the street to be closed without protest. The
Court found that the citizens and residents did acquiesce.
(R. 23.) The evidence supporting this finding is set forth in
appellees' statement of the case, Section 5.
On page 25 appellants state that there is no evidence
that the Railroad would be irreparably damaged if the street
were re-opened. The Court found the contrary in paragraph
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5 of its Findings of Fact. (R. 23, 24.) The evidence supporting the Court's finding is set forth in appellees' statement of
the case, Section 6.
None of the cases cited by appellants undeT points A, B
and G impair the authoTity of tlw lV all and Elkington cases.
City of Roswell v. Mountain State Tel. & Tel Co. from
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cited on pages 21 and
22 of appellants' brief is not inconsistent with the decree
and judgment below. The Roswell case recognizes the applicability of equitable estoppel to municipal corporations in connection with streets and considered its application to that
case but concluded and stated in the excerpt quot,ed by appellants on pages 21 and 22 that the expenditures made by the
telephone company were not in reliance on any representations
or promises by the city. The contrary, of course, is true in the
case at bar as shown under Section 4 of appellants' statement of the case. The reasoning of the Roswell case is such
as to indicate that if such a case as the one at bar were presented, the court would have applied equitable estoppel.
Grand Trunk lV estern Railway Co. v. South Bend, from
the Supreme Court of the United States, cited on page 8,
holds that an ordinance by South Bend repealing a prior
ordinance giving the Railway the right to add a second track
along a public street violated the Constitution of the United
States by impairing the obligation of a contract. There is no
discussion of estoppel.
Murmy v. Pocatello. from the Supreme Court of the
United States, relied on by appellants on page 8, does not
discuss estoppel but merely holds that under the Idaho Constitution, Pocatello had no power to pass an ordinance which
would make impossible the exercise of the police power to
fix the rates of public utilities.
Home Telephone and Telrgraph Co. v. Los Angeles, from
the Supreme Court of the United States cited by appellants on
page 9, contains no discussion of estoppel. It merely holds
that a California statute empowering Los Angeles "to regulate"
the telephone business did not authorize Los Angeles to pass
an ordinance relinquishing entirely the police power of the
State to regulate the rates of the Telephone Company.
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The other cases cited on page 9 are similar to the three
cases from the Supreme Court of the United States. With
the exception of the cases hereinafter specifically described,
none of them discuss the principles of estoppel or abandonment involved in the case at bar.
Appellants feature the case of Keyser v. City of Boise
from the Supreme Court of Idaho on page 9 of their brief.
There is no mention of estoppel in the case. It is merely
authority that the city council of Boise did not have authority
under the Idaho statute to grant an irrevocable license to
install a gasoline tank in a city street. It is supported by
much authority, as is shown on page 10 by the citation of
3 McQuillin Municipal Corporations, Section 1319, and a
large number of cases. The doctrine of the Idaho case, McQuillin and the other cases is wholly inapplicable to the case
at bar. The Supreme Court of Idaho has held that a municipal
corporation may be estopped. Boise v. Wilkinson, 16 Idaho
150, 102 Pac. 148.
The Supreme Court of Georgia in Augusta v. Burum,
cited on page 9, applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel
against Augusta revoking a revocable license to maintain an
awning over part of a public street. The court said (26 L. R.
A. page 344) :

* * * We think that where citizens of Augusta,
with the permission of the city authorities, erected
awnings, which, of course, involved expense, there
would be an equitable stoppel against a needless or
capricious revocation of the permission until after
the lapse of sufficient time to allow the parties incurring the expense to realize, in the use and enjoyment of their awnings, a fair return for their outlay.
Hibbard v. Chicago, cited by appellants on page 9, holds
that a license to erect a glass and metal awning is revocable
and that the city could not be estopped because it had no
power, regardless of procedure followed. However, as shown
above, Illinois is firmly committed to the doctrine of equitable
estoppel against municipal corporations.
In Bangor Twp. v. Bay City Traction & Electric Co.,
cited by appellants on page 9, the Court, while not denying
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that a municipality can be equitably estopped, held that the
street railway company, which had built on a public street
without any authority or promises, was not entitled to the
protection of the doctrine.
,Jn Moore v. New York, cited on page 9, the Court of
Appeals of New York held that New York City would be
estopped to contend that in granting a contract it had irregularly pursued authority with which it was invested.

Most of the cases cited under Points A, B and G a1·e distinguished because under Utah law Provo City had the power
to eliminate the crossing by ordinance or by conduct such as
to estop it from cla.iming that the crossing was not eliminated.
On page 6, appellants state that under the Utah statutes
and decisions a city may vacate a public street "only by
ordinance." Reference is then made to Section 15-8-8 U. C. A.
1943. (Set forth in Appendix B.) It will be observed that the
statute in question does not say "only by ordinance." It merely
grants the power to vacate by ordinance.
The statement that a public street can be vacated only
by ordinance is refuted by the decisions and reasoning in the
cases of TVall v. Salt Lake City and Tooele City v. Hllcington,
both of yvhich are fully discussed sup1·ct.
On pages 7-11 appellants cite McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Second Edition, Vol. 4, Sec. 1515, and many cases
in support of the contention that no estoppel could ~1rise because the City would thereby violate the general law or its
charter. A reading of the text and the cases will disclose that
they refer to cases where the municipal body has no power
to do or is prohibited from doing the act in question. Therein
is the distinction. The Provo City Commission had the power
to eliminate the crossing by virtue of Section 15-8-8. (Set
forth in Appendix B.) It merely failed to follow the prescribed
procedure by passing an ordinance. The distinction between a
complete lack of power and an irregular exercise of the power
is well recognized in the authorities.
On pages 11-13 appellants cite cases in support of the
contention that if municipal corporations have no power to
grant franchises to public utilities they cannot be estopped to
deny that franchises had been granted. It seems unnecessary
to discuss these cases because the grant of a franchise is not
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involved in the case at bar and the City Commission had
statutory power to vacate the street. The right of the Denver
and Rio Grande Western Railroad to operate a railroad system within the city limits of Provo City is not denied nor involved. The sole question is whether Provo City is estopped to
deny that part of a public street extending over the railroad
tracks has been vacated. That Provo City has the power to
vacate the portion of the public street cannot be questioned or
doubted. The power to vacate is expressly granted by statute.
The only question raised is that such power was not pursued
with technical exactness. The Supreme Court of Utah in the
Wall and Elkington cases has held that the City should be
estopped to assert that it did not pursue its authority with
technical exactness.
On pages 14 to 18 appellants contend that the City is
wholly without power to eliminate the crossing except by
ordinance because Section 15-8-8, U. C. A. 1943, (set forth
in Appendix B) permits it to do so by ordinance. But this
ignores the TV nll and Elkington cases, which establish the
Utah law to be that a city may be estopped even as to the
vacation of public streets. Because the Utah law is thus
established, it seems unnecessary further to discuss the many
cases cited on pages 8 to 18 of Appellants' brief. Many of the
cases thus cited are from jurisdictions where the principle
that municipal corporations may be estopped as to public
streets is fully established: e.g. California, Idaho, Iowa,
Illinois.
II

THE ELIMINATION OF THE CROSSING MADE IT
UNNECESSARY TO SECURE FROM THE PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH ANY ORDER PERMITTING THE RAILROAD TO CROSS NINTH SOUTH
STREET.
HEREIN OF APPELLANTS' POINTS C AND D.
Appellants inaccurately state on page 19 that Sec. 76-4-15,
U. C. A. 1943, (set forth in Appendix B) gives the Public
Service Commission exclusive power to abolish any crossing.
A reading of the statute will disclose that it only gives the
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Public Service Commission exclusive power to determine and
prescribe the manner, including the point of crossing and terms
of installation, of a railroad over a public street. The statute
is thus construed in Um'on Pacific R. Co., et al. v. Public
Service Corwmission, 103 Utah 186, 134 Pac. (2d) 469, which
holds that the power granted to cities by Section 15-8-8, U.
C. A. 1943, (set forth in Appendix B) prior to the Public
Utilities law was not repealed by implication thereby. See
page 195.
Analysis reveals that the decision of the question raised
by appellants under Points C and D will follow the decision
of whether the City was properly estopped to claim that the
crossing was not vacated, abandoned or closed.
If the City had kept its promise to pass an ordinance
eliminating the Ninth South crossing, the fee to that property,
owned by the Trustees of The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company (R. 25, 26 = 158), would have been
freed from the public easement. There would have been no
public street to be crossed by the new railroad tracks and the
Public Service Commission of Utah would have no jurisdiction whatever over the construction of said new tracks on
property owned by the Trustees. If the City is estopped to
claim that the crossing is not closed, vacated or abandoned,
as required by law, as concluded by the court (R. 27), the
case is precisely the same as that assumed above. Physically
there is no public street across that space. Exhibits 7, 8 and
10 (R. 511, 513, 517) are pictures of the space formerly occupied by Ninth South. Exhibit 12 (R. 521) shows the barricade
on the west side of the tracks. Exhibit 9 (R. 515) shows the
barricade on the easterly side of said tracks. De facto closing
and vacation of Ninth South Street occurred in May, 1943, and
has since existed.
Provo City now attempts to claim that the crossing was
not vacted because no ordinance was passed. The District
Court held that the City was estopped to make such a contention. If the District Court were correct, the situation so far
as Provo City is concerned is precisely as if the ordinance had
been passed as promised. This is exactly the effect given the
estoppel in Baldwin v. Trimble, 85 Md. 396, 37 At!. 176, and in
Gra,nd Trunk Western R. Co. v. City of Flint, 55 Fed. (2d) 384.
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These perhaps are the reasons that induced the Public
Service Commission to take the view expressed to Bradford and
Jensen that they did not regard the controversy between the
Railroad and the City as a matter in which the Public Service
Commission had any interest and that it did not propose to
pull chestnuts out of the fire for Provo City. (R. 108.)

III
THERE IS NO SUBSTANCE TO APPELLANTS'
CONTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE UTAH REFERENDUM STATUTE.
HEREIN OF APPELLANTS' POINT E
Appellants assume that the Utah referendum statute
(Section 25-10-21 Utah Code Annotated 1943, set forth in
Appendix B) would be applicable to an ordinance vacating
or an order abandoning the crossing. It is not at all clear
that this assumption is correct. The Supreme Court discussed the applicability of the referendum statute in Keigley,
et al. v. Bench, 97 Utah 69; 89 Pac. (2d) 480 and stated the
test of applicability to be whether the ordinance in question
is legislative or administrative in character. On page 78
the court stated the determinative test as follows:
It is apparent that here, where we are examining
the original ordinance in juxtaposition to that enacted
on August 5, 1938, to determine whether the changes
made are legislative or administrative, the determinative test is the first. Does the later ordinance make
a new law or execute one already in existence?
It is submitted that neither an ordinance vacating a
crossing pursuant to Sec. 15-8-8, U. C. A. 1943, (set forth in
Appendix B) nor an order abandoning the crossing pursuant
to Sec. 36-1-3, U. C. A. 1943, (set forth in Appendix B) is
legislative in character but is executive or administrative.
Otherwise each of the multitudinous acts of the City having
to do with the establishment or vacation or abandonment of
streets or parts thereof would be subject to referendum. Utmost confusion would result and it would become impossible
for the municipality to perform its functions.
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But assuming that such an ordinance would be subject
to the referendum statute, it must be clear that a municipality
cannot avoid the estoppel resulting from the acts and conduct
of its Commission by pointing to the referendum statute
and contending that they are thereby deprived of their right
to resort to the referendum statute. The City's contention in
this particular would eliminate the settled law of Utah, announced by the Wall and Elkington cases, that municipalities
may be equitably estopped under certain circumstances.
Appellants' brief would make it appear that the citizens
of Provo are anxious to avoid the closing of Ninth South
Street but are frustrated in that desire by the doctrine of
equitable estoppel. This is based upon a petition in March
1943, signed by some 200 citizens protesting the closing of
the crossing. Appellants' assume that no more diligence is
required by citizens to protect their rights than merely to file
a petition with the City Commission even though thereafter
they slumber soundly on their rights. There was a public
announcement that the protesl was disregarded by the City.
The Mayor of Provo told the press on April 7, 1943, that
the street would be closed and the enlargement of the yards
would proceed. (Exhibit 26 IL 533.) During the two or three
months thereafter the streets actually were closed and the
yards constructed. If the citizens of Provo were so vitally
interested in the matter, then was the time for them to move
effectively by injunction, by "initiating" an ordinance to prevent the street closing under the referendum statute or other
appropriate procedure. Instead, lhey were content to protest
and remain silent when their protest was ignored.
The Supreme Court of Utah has held that this is not
sufficient diligence. J,ewis v. Pingree Nat. Bank, 47 Utah 35,
151 Pac. 558. The Bank entrance encroached on a public street
so that it partially obscured the show windows on either side
thereof. The owners on either side protested but did nothing
more during the construction of the building. The court held
that it was not enough to protest but that affirmative steps
should have been taken to prevent the purpresture. The
court on page 48 said :
So here. If the plaintiff desired to prevent the
erection of the bank front as planned, and as all others
who were interested with him understood it was plan-
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ned, and as he must have known it was planned and
was being constructed, why did he not bring an action,
as was done in the Tyson Case, which he now cites
and relies on? Had he done that, the courts would
undoubtedly have prevented the defendant from proceeding to erect the front as proposed by it. * * *
Under those circumstances we think the plaintiff should
be limited to his legal remedy, namely, the recovery of
such an amount of damages as the usable value of his
building may be depreciated by reason of the construction of the bank front as it now is.
IV
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING THE PETITION TO INTERVENE.
HEREIN OF APPELLANTS' POINT F.
The motion to intervene (R. 17) merely alleges that
Thomas F. Pierpont, L. E. 'Vaid and G. T. Harrison were
citizens of Provo and that the Railroad's petition affected
their rights and that they had a defense to the Railroad's
claims. There is no allegation that Provo City and its Nic:yor
and Commissioners were not adequately representing the
interests of the public; nor of fraud or bad faith or bad judgment on the part of the City, its Mayor and Commissioners in
the handling of the common interests; nor of any conspiracy
between the City, its Mayor and Commissioners with the
Railroad.
Rule 24, Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts
of the United States, provides for intervention as of right
and permissive intervention. Under neither clas~~ification is
intervention allowed merely because the intervener so desires.
If Pierpont, Waid and Harrison had a right to intervene,
then, so far as the petition to intervene discloses, every other
citizen of Provo had the same right, whether they viewed the
matter in the same way as Pierpont, Waid and Harrison or
differently. The result would be chaos. It is well settled that
the citizens of a municipality do not have the right to intervene and participate in a litigation to which the municipality
is a party in the absence of a showing of fraud, bad faith,
bad judgment or conspiracy.
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O'Connell v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 19 Fed. (2d)
460 (9th C. C. A.). The Pacific Gas & Electric Co. brought an
action against San Francisco in a rate controversy. O'Connell
sought to intervene. The trial court refused the intervention.
The Circuit Court of Appeals held it was not an abuse of
discretion. On page 461 the court said:
If the appellant is entitled to intervene and be
heard upon the question of the relative advantage of
continuing the litigation to a final determination, rather
than accepting the proposed compromise, the question
is one upon which more than 100,000 consumers of
gas are likewise entitled to be heard, none of whom
has accepted the appellant's championship or indicated
a purpose to join in intervention. * * *
* * * Here neither fraud, bad faith, bad
judgment, nor conspiracy is shown on the part of the
municipal authorities, who represent all of the gas
consumers.
The foregoing case relied on Re Engelhard, 231 U. S.
646, 58 L. Ed. 416, 34 S. Ct. 258.
That there was no difference between Pierpont, Waid
and Harrison on the one hand and the City of Provo on the
other as to how this litigation should be conducted, is conclusively demonstrated by the fact that George S. Ballif,
counsel of record for Pierpont, Waid and Harrison, is also
counsel of record for Provo City, its Mayor and Commissioners,
and actively participated in the formation of the pleadings,
the trial of the case, the taking of the appeal, the preparation
of the record and the appellants' brief. He appeared as attorney for Pierpont, Waid and Harrison in the Motions to
Intervene filed April 20, 1945, (R. 17, 47) ; as attorney for
Provo City, its Mayor and Commissioners on March 31, 1945;
at the hearing of the Motion to Dismiss (R. 12, 47) ; as attorney
for Provo City, its Mayor and Commissioners on May 14,
1945, when the two cases were consolidated for pre-trial and
trial (R. 17) ; as attorney for Provo City, its Mayor and
Commissioners on May 14th at the pre-trial (R. 18). He
actively participated in the trial of the case, examining and
cross-examining witnesses. He produced and examined as
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witnesses Mr. Thomas F. Pierpont (R. 368), Mr. Lyle E.
Waid, (R. 355) and Mr. G. T. Harrison (R. 315). After the
taking of the evidence and at the time set for argument Mr.
I. E. Brockbank, City Attorney for Provo City, became sick
and Mr. Ballif alone made the argument for Provo City, its
Mayor and Commissioners. The Notice of Appeal, the stipulation designating the record on appeal and appellants' brief all
bear the name of Mr. Ballif.
There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that
there was any difference of opinion between Mr. Ballif and
Mr. Brockbank as to the conduct of this litigation. It is evident
from the record that they were cooperating harmoniously
throughout. The record affirmatively shows that there was
neither merit nor substance to the petition to intervene.

v
A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE CANNOT ll'i1PAIR OR
RESTRICT THE .JURISDICTION OF A FEDERAL EQUITY
COURT.
HEREIN OF APPELLANTS' POINTS H AND I.
Appellants contend that this Federal Equity Court is without power to enjoin Provo City because the officers of Provo
City were required by a municipal ordinance to remove obstructions to the street. This contention is contrary to the
well established principle that the jurisdiction of Federal
Equity Courts cannot be impaired or restricted by State laws.
This has been twice decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in cases arising from Utah.

The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co.

v. L1:nck, 56 Fed. (2d) 957.
National City Bank of New York v. Continental
National Bank & Trust Co. of S. L. C., 83 Fed. (2d) 134.
In the Linck case the contention was made that the Utah
Public Utilities law prohibited the Federal Court from issuing
an injunction. This court said, page 960:

* * * The state cannot, even if it so desired,
deprive the federal courts of their equity jurisdiction
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to grant injunctions in proper cases. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U. S. 196,
44 S. Ct. 553, 68 L. Ed. 975.
If the State legislature cannot do so, certainly the Provo City
Commissioners cannot.
Reference to 35 C. J. S., Title Federal Courts, Section 7,
page 784, and to Federal Digest, Subject Courts, Key Number
259, will disclose literally thousands of cases to this effect.
In the bankruptcy case the power to enjoin is specifically
granted in Chapter 2 of the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U. S. C. 11,
subsection 15.
VI
THE COURT'S FINDINGS Aim AMPLY SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
HEREIN OF APPELLANTS' POINT J.
Point J is stated on page 6 and at the bottom of p<l.ge 27
of appellants' brief. On pages 28 to 30 appellants set forth
nine paragraphs of the Court's Findings and assert that they
are contrary to the evidence. On page 30 it is asserted that
the Federal Court should have made Findings of Fact contrary to the findings in those nlne paragraphs and that certain
additional Findings of Fact should have been made.
Appellants content themselves with a mere ipse dixit.
No reference to the record is made in support of the contentions. The Court is left to search through a 550 page printed
record to find why the Findings of Fact as made are contrary
to the evidence and to ascertain what evidence supports the
'findings that appellants contend should have been made.
Appellants have wholly failed to satisfy Rule 52 of Rules
of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United
States providing that 'findings of fact shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous.
The words of Circuit Judge Huxman in Aluminum, Inc.
151 Fed. (2d) 652
seem appropriate. (p. 653.)

v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation,

* * * In other words, they dumped the entire
record in our laps and asked us to do their work for
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them by requiring us to go through this labyrinth and
abstract and search out what is necessary for a consideration of the questions presented, and separate it
from the chaff.
Appellees statement of the case shows the evidence supporting the Findings to be overwhelming.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment and decree
of the District Court should be affirmed.

P. T.

FARNSWORTH, JR.

W. Q. VANCOTT,
GRANT H. BAGLEY,
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APPENDIX A

Jurisdiction of the United States Court
Jurisdiction in No. 3239, the civil suit, is based upon 28
U. S. C. Section 41, because the corporate plaintiff is a citizen
of Delaware, plaintiffs Wilson McCarthy and Henry Swan
are citizens of Colorado, Provo City is a Utah municipal corporation and the Mayor and Commissioners are citizens of
Utah. The amount involved is in excess of $3,000.00, exclusive
of interest and costs. It is well settled that a municipal corporation of a State is a citizen of that State for purposes of
jurisdiction.

Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118.
Seattle v. 0. & W. R. Co., 255 U. S. 56, 65 L. Ed. 200, 41
S. Ct. 237.

Cahill v. Hovcnden, 132 Fed. (2d) 422, lOth C. C. A.
Jurisdiction in No. 3240 was exercised pursuant to a
petition by the Trustee in bankruptcy authorized by an order
of the District Judge of the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado. In the Matter of The Denver and
Rio Grande V!estern Railroad Company, Debtor, in Proceedings for the Reorganization of thni Railroad. Exhibit 1 is
a copy of such order. (R. 504.)
As to whether jurif\diction should be exercised in the
plenary civil suit or in the ancillary bankruptcy proceeding is
not entirely clear and for that reason both of said proceedings
were instituted and maintained. Authorities bearing on the
question are :

Shortridge v. Utah Sa,vings & Trust Co., 40 Fed.
(2d) 328, lOth C. C. A.
Thompson v. Terminal Shares, 104 Fed. (2d) 1
8th C. C. A.; certiorari denied 308 U. S. 559, 84 L. Ed.
470, 60 S. Ct. 100.
Keaton v. Looney, 111 Fed. (2d) 34, lOth C. C. A.
In re Missouri Pac. R. Co., 24 Fed. Supp. 724,
District Court of Missouri.
Schaffer v. Hughes, 139 Fed. (2d) 438, 8th C.
C. A.
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Continental Illinm:s Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 294 U. S. 648,
79 L. Ed. 1110, 55 S. Ct. 595. On page 676 the court
said:
It may be that in an ordinary bankruptcy proceeding the issue of an injunction in the circumstances here
presented would not be sustained. As to that it is not
necessary to express an opinion. But a proceeding
under section 77 (11 U. S. C. A. Sec. 205) is not an
ordinary proceeding in bankruptcy. It is a special proceeding which seeks only to bring about a reorganization if a satisfactory plan to that end can be devised.
And to prevent the attainment of that object is to defeat the very end the accomplishment of which was the
sole aim of the section, and thereby to render its
provisions futile.
The bankruptcy court, in granting the injunction,
was well within its power, either as a virtual court of
equity, or under the broad provisions of section 2 (15)
of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S. C. A. Sec. 11 (15) or of
section 262 of the Judicial Code (28 U. S. C. A. Sec.
377).
The reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States
in the last case cited suggests that the jurisdiction of the
United States court in a railroad reorganization case, under
Section 77, may be broader than in ordinary bankruptcy cases.
APPENDIX B

Text of Various Utah Strttutes
Section 15-8-8 Utah Code Annotated 1943 reads as follows:
They (the Board of Commissioners) may lay out,
establish, open, alter, widen, narrow, extend, grade,
pave or otherwise improve streets, alleys, avenues,
boulevards, sidewalks, parks, airports and public
grounds, and may vacate the same or parts thereof,
by ordinance.
Section 25-10-21 Utah Code Annotated 1943 reads as
follows:
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, legal
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voters of any city or town, in such numbers as herein
required, may initiate any desired legislation and cause
the same to be submitted to the law-making body, or to
a vote of the people of such city or town for approval
or rejection, or may require any law or ordinance
passed by the law-making body of such city or town
to be submitted to the voters thereof before such law
or ordinance shall take effect.
Section 76-4-15 Utah Code Annotated 1943 reads as
follows:
( 1) No track of any railroad shall be constructed
across a public road, highway or street at grade, nor
shall the track of any railroad corporation be constructed across the track of any other railroad or
street railroad corporation at grade, nor shall the
track of a street railroad corporation be constructed
across the track of a railroad corporation :1t grade,
without the permission of the commission having first
been secured; provided, that this subsection shall not
apply to the replacement of lawfully existing tracks.
The commission shall have the right to refuse its permission or to grant it upon such terms and conditions
as it may prescribe.
(2) The Commission shall have the exclusive
power to determine and prescribe the manner, including the particular point of crossing, and the terms of
installation, operation, maintenance, use and protection of each crossing of one railroad by another railroad
or street railroad, and of a street railroad by a railroad
and of each crossing of a public road or highway by
a railroad or street railroad, and of a street by a railroad or vice versa, and to alter or abolish any such
crossing, to restrict the use of such crossings to certain
types of traffic in the interest of public safety and is
vested with power and it shall be its duty to designate
the railroad crossings to be traversed by school busses
and motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire, and
to require, where in its judgment it would be practicable, a separation of grades at any such crossing
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heretofore or hereafter established, and to prescribe
the terms upon which such separation shall be made and
the proportions in which the expense of the alteration
or abolition of such crossings or the separation of such
grades shall be divided between the railroad or street
railroad corporations affected, or between such corporations and the state, county, municipality or other
public authority in interest.
(3) Whenever the commission shall find that public convenience and necessity demand the establishment,
creation or construction of a crossing of a street or
highway over, under or upon the tracks or lines of
any public utility, the commission may by order, decision, rule or decree require the establishment, construction or creation of such crossing, and such crossing shall thereupon become a public highvvay and
crossing.
Compiled Laws of Utah 1876, Sec. 1174 reads as follows:
That whenever the title to such lands shall be held
by the corporate authorities of any town or city, all
lands designated for public use by such corporate
authorities as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks,
commons and public grounds, shall vest in and be held
by the corporation absolutely, and shall not be claimed
adversely by any person or persons whatsoever; and
the judge of probate who shall have entered any lands
in trust for any town or city which may afterwards become incorporated, shall, under the same conditions,
convey by deed to the corporation thereof the lands
designated for the use of the public as aforesaid; that
in the case of death or disability of the judge of probate
or mayor who may have entered the lands in trust for
any town or city under the law of Congress, as aforesaid, before the complete execution of such trust, the
same shall vest in his successor in office, who shall
proceed with the execution of the same in the same
manner, and under the same conditions imposed by this
act upon the judge or mayor receiving the trust in the
first instance.
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APPENDIX C

Discussion of Promissory Estoppel
It is well settled that equitable estoppel may be based
upon representations of a promissory nature.

31 C. J. S. Sec. 80 reads as follows:
The doctrine of estoppel by representation is ordinarily applicable only to representations as to facts
either past or present, and not to representations or
promises concerning the future which, if binding at all,
must be binding as contracts.
Notwithstanding the unanimity of the courts with
respect to the preceding statement as the statement of
a general rule, representations as to the future or
promises have been enforced or permitted to operate as
a basis of an equitable estoppel if to do otherwise would
help perpetrate a fraud or cause injustice in a case
where the representation or promise has been made
to induce action or is reasonably calculated to induce
action and has in fact induced action on the part of
the party setting up the estoppel. This exception has
come to be known as the doctrine of promissory
estoppel.
Accord:

Jones Store Co. v. Dean, 56 Fed. (2d) 110 (8th
C. C. A.)
Colbath v. H. B. Stebbins Lumber Co. 127 Me. 406,
144 Atl. 1.
Raldne Realty Corp'n v. Brooks, 281 Mass. 233,
183 N. E. 419.
Thom v. Thom, 208 Minn. 461, 294 N. W. 461.
Hanna State & Savings Bank v. Matson, 53 Wyo. 1,
77 Pac. (2d) 621.
American Law Inst:itute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Section 90, reads as follows:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and
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substantial character on the part of the promisee and
which does induce such action or forebearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise.
1 Wnliston, Contr. Rev. Ed. Sec. 139, page 502, reads as
follows:
There would seem, however, compelling reasons of
justice for enforcing promises, where injustice cannot
be otherwise avoided, when they have led the promisee
to incur any substantial detriment on the faith of them,
not only when the promisor intended, but also when
he should reasonably have expected, such detriment
would be incurred, though he did not request it as an
exchange for his promise.
There is an excellent annotation on the subject in 115
A. L. R. 152.

